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Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind
and Will of a Legislature
REED DICKERSON*
THE QUESTION
The literature of statutory interpretation is rich in references to
the "intent" or "purpose" of the legislature, terms suggesting that a
legislature may have subjective attitudes and drives such as those
possessed by a human being. Recognizing, of course, that even an or-
ganization that is composed of human beings is not itself a human being,
we must then ask what adjustments, if any, should be made in legal
theories, respecting the reading and application of statutes, that assume
that a legislature is a thinking, motivated organism. If such an assump-
tion is fictional, the risk that attends treating fiction as fact may be sub-
stantial, especially if the fiction is unnecessary. Because of the practical
consequences of making a wrong assumption here, it may be worth
taking a closer look at "legislative intent", and "legislative purpose."
PART I: LEGISLATIVE INTENT
"[T]he psychic transference of the thought of an arti-
ficial body must stagger the most advanced of the ghost
hunters . . ."'
Introduction
One of the most fundamental, and at the same time elusive, concepts
in the interpretation and application of statutes is that of legislative
intent.
The appeal of the concept is strong. In the division of responsi-
bilities represented by the constitutional separation of powers, the legis-
lature calls the main policy turns and the courts must respect its pro-
nouncements. In such a relationship, it would seem clear that so far as
the legislature has expressed itself by statute, the courts should try to
*Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University; Commissioner for In-
diana, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; author, LEGISLA-
TIVE DRAFTING (1954), THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1965); A.B. 1931,
Williams College; LL.B. 1934, Harvard University; LL.M. 1939, J.S.D. 1950, Columbia
University. This article will appear as chapters 7 and 8 of the forthcoming book,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (Little, Brown and Co.).
SJ.. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAV 170 (2d ed. 1921).
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determine as accurately as possible what the legislature intended to be
done.
Unfortunately, this objective is not easily realized, because people
are not always successful in communicating their thoughts. Difficulties
of this kind are familiar in all aspects of human experience, and no
parade of examples is needed to document the fact. And yet, these
difficulties do not signify that communication is impossible.
All this seems to be supported by common sense and personal ex-
perience. On the other hand, is there not reason to suspect that "common
sense" is not always reliable? Scientists tell us, for example, that the
"solidity" that we experience in objects such as tables and typewriters
is not a characteristic that nuclear physicists experience when they
examine the materials from which such objects are made. And so, they
tell us, we cannot always take for granted what seems obvious to the
eye, ear, or touch.' Many students of legislation have come to a similar
conclusion for "legislative intent."
The Radin Onslaught
More than four decades ago, Professor Radin wrote one of the
most devastating analyses of legislative intent ever made. Its impact is
still felt.3 Briefly, he says that it is unrealistic to talk about legislative
intent because the notion of "the law maker" is fictional; there is no
such person. Nor is it realistic to talk about the intent of the heteroge-
neous collectivity known as "the legislature." In roost cases, only one
or two persons drafted the bill, many persons voted against it, and those
who voted for it may have entertained differing ideas and beliefs. Even
if the participating legislators had the same intent, we have no means of
knowing it except "by the external utterances or behavior of these
hundreds of men." 4 Even if a unanimous legislative intent were know-
able, it would be powerless to bind the courts, because the legislators'
function is not to impose their respective wills, but to "pass statutes."5
Even if legislative intent had binding force, it couk hardly control the
final interpretation in advance, because the legislature could not have
2 Stebbing, "Furniture of the Earth," in PHILOSOPHY OF SOENcE 69, 73 (A. Danto
& S. Morgenbesser eds. 1960). The fallacy of this point is, of course, that it denies
meaning to a well-established word ("solid"), whereas the significant problem is simply
to redescribe what the word customarily refers to. Id. at 74. See also A. Ross, ON LAW
AND JUSTICE 114 (1959).
3 Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (193)) [hereinafter cited as
Radin].
4Id. at 870.
tId. at 871.
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intended to cover a particular factual situation that did not yet exist.
Finally, legislative intent is irrelevant under any rule of interpretation
that limits the interpreter to the text of the statute.6
The folly of any attempt to conjure up a legislative intent has been
asserted so often that many respectable scholars refuse to recognize the
concept.7  So deep is their antipathy that the very phrase "legislative
intent" has become a legislative impropriety that they feel necessary to
avoid. Even those who let the expression pass their lips are careful to
protect their professional respectability by pointing out that they use it to
refer, instead, to some objective expression or the more acceptable con-
cept of legislative purpose.' Because so many professional commentators
apparently agree, it is strange that the concept of a subjective legislative
intent keeps cropping up. If it is truly a ghost, we should banish it once
and for all.
What Is "Intent"?
In the present context, "intent" refers usually to the actual intent
of some human being, or group of human beings, respecting what he or
they intended to say. It reflects the user's expectation that the reader
or hearer will take the language as referring to what the user had in
mind. It is, therefore, the specific message that the user intended to
convey.
"Intent" is also used in the sense of the intent objectively mani-
fested by the language used. Because language has meaning independent
of the actual intent of the user, the meaning actually carried may imply
an intent that differs from the user's actual intent. It will be useful,
therefore, to distinguish actual subjective intent from manifest intent.
Actual intent, which is necessarily a conscious activity, must be
distinguished also from what Professor Fuller has called "tacit legis-
lative assumptions," the underlying propositions that the user of lan-
guage takes for granted without taking express account of them and,
perhaps, without even being aware of them.' These assumptions, in
6 Id. at 870-72.
7 E.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 86 (1964); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW 170 (2d ed. 1921); R. KEErON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 81
(1969); Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1965); Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U.
TORONTO L.J. 286, 290 (1936).
8 E.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 538 (1947) ; Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335,
340-41 (1949).
9 The absent-minded professor stepping from his office into the hall as he reads
a book "assumes" that the floor of the hall will be there to receive him. His
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turn, have their objective counterparts in whatever may be fairly in-
ferred from the language actually used. Such an inference may be one
that the user neither intended nor took for granted.
With these distinctions in mind, we may now inquire whether actual
subjective intent "exists" and, if so, whether it is relevant to and useful
in the interpretation of statutes.
Professor MacCallum, in his penetrating analysis of legislative
intent, points out that a legislator may have many intents with respect
to a statute." He lists as possibilities the intent to enact a statute, the
intent to enact this statute, the intent to enact the particular words in
question, the intent to enact their meaning, the intent to enact his under-
standing of their meaning, the intent to further some ulterior purpose, 1
and the intent to further his own legislative career. For present pur-
poses, only these are immediately relevant: the intent to enact this
statute, the intent to enact these words, the intent to enact their meaning,
and the intent to enact the legislator's understanding of their meaning.
Because the legislator in question voted for it, the intent to enact
this statute may be taken for granted. Also, it is hard to see any signifi-
cance in an intent to enact words apart from their meaning. Two signifi-
cant intents remain: the intent to enact the meaning of these words
(as normally read) and the intent to enact them as the legislator inter-
prets them.
Because the significant intent is that of a person who is familiar
with the text and supports it, it is suggested that the two intents coalesce
psychologically into a single intent: the intent to enact these words as
the legislator understands them, coupled with the tacit assumption that
his understanding is the same as that of a typical member of the legis-
lative audience. To assume differently is to assume that the purpose is
to deceive or confuse (which, fortunately, is the rare exception).
Even if reference to "legislative intent" in the subjective sense is
sometimes questionable, little objection can be found to the expression
"manifest intent" (which by definition is objectively determinable),
conduct is conditioned and directed by this assumption, even though the possi-
bility that the floor has been removed does not "occur" to him, that is, is not
present in his conscious mental processes.
L. Fuller, Some Fallacies in Theories About Interpretation, Feb. 3, 1959, at 5 (unpub-
lished paper for Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, Harvard Law School) [on file with
Professor Dickerson].
10 MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 756 (1966). Cf. Nunez, The
Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to
Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9 CAL. WEST. L. REx. 128 (1972).
11 For a discussion of ulterior purpose, see text accompanying notes 61 & 62 infra.
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except that it appears to be a mere synonym for "meaning to the typical
reader." To avoid possible confusion, it may be preferable to confine
the term "legislative intent" to actual or supposed subjective intent, and
to use the term "meaning" to designate what is suggested by the rele-
vant language of the statute when read in its proper context.
There is also a possible difference between the intent to achieve an
immediate result by means of a statute (what the authors intend to do)
and the accompanying intent to express that result in the statute (what
the authors intend to say). Here, again, the two intents coalesce into an
intent to convey a particular idea, coupled with the tacit assumption
that what the authors intend to say reflects adequately what they intend
to immediately accomplish.
The Specific Arguments
Radin's first point is that there is no single person whom we can
call "the legislator" and whose mind we can successfully investigate to
discover the legislative intent behind a statute. 2 The point is indisput-
able. However, it does not say that there is no such thing as legislative
intent; it says only that we cannot find it in the mind of some person
comparable to the author of a private communication.
The second point is that it is futile to look for legislative intent in
the minds of a large and heterogeneous group such as a legislature.3
What about those who voted against the bill? This poses no problem
under majority rule, where once the statute has been enacted the views
of the minority are for the most part irrelevant. What about those who
voted for the bill but did not read it or did not read the particular pro-
vision in question? What is their legislative intent? Again, the answer
seems plain: they intended to adopt or acquiesce in either (1) the intent
manifested by the bill and the other objective indicia of intent, which is
directly determinable, or (2) the actual intent of those conversant with
the bill, which is not.'" Because such a derivative intent can only support
what must be independently determined, its content has only subordinate
'
2 Radin at 870.
is Id.
14 In the enactment of statutes there is delegation, too, with respect to sponsor-
ship and draftsmanship . . . . The legislature expects that statutes will be
drafted by others, not only by its [own] arms . . . but also by agencies and
individuals outside the legislature. In such situations the intent, purpose, and
draftsmanship of others is adopted as its own by the legislature. On this theory
there is no statute without a legislative intent or purpose. It is a glib super-
ficiality to suggest otherwise.
Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND ToMoRRoW 1, 27
(M. Paulsen ed. 1959).
[Vol. 50:206
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interest. (If valid, Radin's legislative misgivings might lead us also to
question the "judicial intent" of a nine-man court.)
This narrows the search to the actual intent of the particular legis-
lators who undertook to sponsor, mold, and understand the bill. In a
few cases, the significant legislative intent might be that merely of the
draftsman whose handiwork the legislature adopted. Although this
would be unusual for an entire bill, the draftsman often includes in-
dividual provisions to which no legislator pays particular attention even
though several may have carefully scrutinized the bill as a whole. Here,
it would seem appropriate to say that the legislative intent of the partici-
pating legislators is to adopt or acquiesce in the legislative intent mani-
fested by the bill when viewed in its proper legislative setting or to adopt
or acquiesce in the actual intent of the draftsman.
However, an adoption approach suffices only when the intent
adopted is that of an individual author. Where there is a group of
authors, the problem of institutional intent is simply transferred from
the legislature as a whole to the group as a whole.
The usual case is that in which the statute or provision was de-
veloped or scrutinized by a handful of legislators operating as a sub-
committee of a standing committee. Even here, says Radin, there may
be frequent differences of opinion or understanding. For an actual
legislative intent that we may attribute by adoption or acquiescence
first to those who voted for the bill, second to the legislature as a whole,
and ultimately to the chief executive who signed it, whose intent do
we seek? Is this not an insuperable difficulty?
But to talk of actual "legislative intent" even here is not entirely
fatuous. Among such a group there can be a general consensus, 5 even
though the views of the participants vary in many details. Variant views
have not deterred legislative and quasi-legislative bodies from sharing
general objectives and from using their intent to accomplish these
objectives as a basis for future operations. That a general consensus is
a consensus and nothing more, leaving unresolved particular issues on
which the participants disagree, does not mean that the consensus is
not operating in the area where it exists.' The error seems to be in
assuming that, if there is an ascertainable legislative intent, it necessarily
resolves the question at hand, and conversely that, if it does not resolve
15 On consensus, see T. NEwcOMB, R. TURNER, & P. CONVER;E, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
ch. 8 (1965).
16 "It is surely not necessary for persons to agree in all cascs in order for them to
agree in some cases." MacCallum, Legislatve Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 770 (1966) (em-
phasis in original).
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the question at hand, it must not have existed.,
Moreover, in ascertaining the message that the language used was
intended to convey, the intentions and opinions of some actively partici-
pating legislators are usually more significant than those of others.
Thus, the expressions of the sponsor of the bill normally reveal a
legislative intent more significant than that revealed by those of a more
casual legislative adherent. In this context, the significant legislative
intent may well be the actual intent of the former.
If this analysis is correct, the mere multiplicity of legislators is
insufficient reason for ruling out the possibility of an actual legislative
intent. At most it blurs the already difficult problem of determining the
actual intent of particular individuals.
The possibility of an effective general consensus suggests the further
possibility of a real (not fictitious) corporate legislative intent consisting,
not of the shared intent of a group of improbably like-minded legisla-
tors, but of the composite thrust of many individual intents, no one of
which need wholly coincide with the composite.17 Such an institutional
intent is best likened to the resultant of a set of vectors. Although
even an organic group, as such, has no separate psyche, its activities dis-
play the characteristics of intentional behavior guided by an aggregate
motivation that is useful to recognize and take into account. Such a
group intent differs from the constituent individual intents; it is signfi-
cant; and, through reasonable inference, it can be broadly identified.
If there is something approaching an institutional state of mind, why
not recognize it in a legislature ?18
For this concept, the term "legislative intent" is apt, because it is
one that usage has already firmly attached. Asserting that legislative
intent does not exist because a legislature, as an abstraction, cannot
17 "'[Clollective intent' in the light of modem psychology is not as unrealistic a
concept as it is made out to be by jurists . . . ." Silving, A Plea for a Law of Inter-
pretation, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 510 (1950), citing Sigmund Freud as recognizing "the
reality of psychological experiences of groups or masses." Id. n.39. See also MacCallum,
stpra note 16, at 763-66.
Work with groups has shown that they have characteristics and exhibit features that
differ from the aggregate of the characteristics and features of the individual members
of the group. See R. BROWN, SOcIAL PsYcHoLoGY ch. 13 (1965) ; L. DooD, SOCIAL Psy-
cHOLOGY 219 (1952). For example, when individuals are presented with a problem, their
individual solutions are "less risky" than those proposed by a group made up of the same
individuals. The conclusion has been drawn that this "shift of the risk" is solely a func-
tion of the existence of groups. Wallach, Kagan, & Bem, Group Influence on Individual
Risk Taking, 65 J. ABNORM. & Soc. Psy. 75 (1962). See also Sherif, Group Influcnce
upon the Formation of Norins and Attitudes, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 77
(T. Newcomb & E. Hartley eds. 1947).
Is "[L]egislatures are enough like men in important respects to be counted as having
intentions." MacCallum, supra note 16, at 765-66.
[Vol. 50:206
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intend anything, is like asserting that there is no such thing as ptomaine
poisoning because food ptomaines are not in themselves poisonous.
Whatever its origin, a word means what custom uses it to refer to. 9
Here, fortunately, usage remains close to semantic origins, because
legislative intent is ultimately rooted in individual intents.
This leads us to Radin's third point: even if there were perfect
unanimity of understanding and intent, we could discover that intent
only through the utterances of hundreds of men." But why a wealth of
evidences of intent would make the problem harder rather than easier
is not clear. If we assume complete agreement, it should be necessary
only to determine the intent of a single legislator. With the utterances
of others as a cross-check, we could more easily select the most reliable
and revealing utterances. The factual supposition is, of course, fanci-
ful.
Because the mere multiplicity of utterances does not seem to pose
a serious problem, Radin's main point may have been, instead, the im-
possibility of knowing even an individual's actual intent. We have, of
course, no means of peering into an individual's consciousness. Unfor-
tunately, the argument proves too much: communication itself is
impossible, inside and outside the law. It is interesting, indeed, to
speculate on Radin's own "legislative intent." By his apparent stand-
ards, it cannot be inferred from the language of his article. On the
other hand, it is comforting to know that despite this baffling problem,
the philosophers of language still presume to communicate. Wittgen-
stein, for one, apparently does not find this a serious problem." And so,
Radin's logical tour de force can claim the same kind of practical success
as the well-known, "irrefutable" proof that bumblebees cannot fly."
Radin's fourth point is that, even if there were an ascertainable leg-
islative intent, it would be powerless to bind the court, because the
function of legislators is not to "impose their will" but to "pass
statutes."'" The underlying assumption here overlooks the point made in
Burke's speech to the Bristol electors that-as a matter of both in-fact
expectations and sound political principle-legislators are sent to "impose
their will," not according to personal whim, but by exercising rational
choice, where it is impractical to act by town meetings. :"4
1 See note 2 supra.
20 See Radin at 870.
21 See generally L. WVITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTICATIONS (G. Anscombe
transl. 1953).
22See B. STILLSON, NINrGs: INSEcTS, BIRDS, MEN 54 (1954).
23 Radin at 871.
24 2 E. BURKE, WORKS 89, 96 (7th ed. 1881).
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More important, Radin seems to say that, although the court should
look at the language of the statute, it may treat as nonexistent any actual
legislative intent that it expresses. Such a view of legislation suggests
that statutes stand no higher than the finger painting allegedly done in
the late 1950's by a Baltimore chimpanzee. What devastating discourage-
ment it woul heap on the legislative draftsman, who works under the
illusion that he is somehow helping the legislature to communicate to
the public. Indeed, it is fascinating to contemplate a legislative function
that could produce statutes without reflecting the will of the participat-
ing legislators. As Lord Russell said in another connection, "This is
one of those views which are so absurd that only very learned men could
possibly adopt them."2
Radin's fifth point is that legislative intent, even if determinable,
cannot relate to a specific factual situation that, being nonexistent when
the intention was formed, could not have been specifically foreseen."6
It overlooks the elementary distinction between the connotations of
words, which, being general, may express the general intent of the
utterer, and their specific denotations, which, not being limited to deno-
tations in existence at the time of the utterance, inevitably include deno-
tations that not only were not then in existence but could not have been
specifically envisioned.27 Even a particular subclass of events is not ex-
25B. RUSSELL, MY PHILOSOPHICAL DEVFLOPiENT 148 (1959). The theory under
attack may not have originated wholly with Radin. Cf. Lenhoff, On Interpretative
Theories: A Comparative Study in Legislation, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 312, 326 (1949), dis-
cussing Kohler's views. But what does he assert? That there is no such thing as legis-
lative intent? Or merely (as with Holmes) that legislative intent, so far as it is un-
revealed by statutory meaning in its fullest and most sophisticated sense, may be dis-
regarded?
It is to Radin's credit that 12 years later, while sticking to his main guns, he made a
limited concession to the subjectivity of legislative purpose as revealed by legislative his-
tory. Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HAgv. L. REv. 388, 411 (1942).
26 Radin at 870-71. According to Professor Patterson, the theory that legislative
intent is a myth is based on the "psychological theory of the meanings of symbols.'
E. PAtTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 202 (1953). Under this
theory,
[a] term is an effective means of communication if it causes the utteree to have
in mind the same referent that the utterer had in mind ...
• . . [It is] inadequate to explain the logical function of legal symbols,
their ability to enable us to make inferences or applications to referents which
the person or persons uttering them did not "have in mind."
Id. at 27-28 (footnote omitted). Professor Fuller calls this the "pointer theory of mean-
ing." L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 84 (rev. ed. 1969). Accepting the pointer
theory seems to be an occupational hazard of case-hardened lawyers. See, e.g., S. MER-
MIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 224 (1973). See also Jones, Statutory Doubts and
Legislative Intention, 40 COLUm. L. REv. 957, 972 (1940).
27 F. PATTERSON, supra note 26, at 203; 2A C.D. SANDS, [SUTHERLAND] STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.02 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
[Vol. 50:206
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cluded from a broad legislative intent merely because the legislator did
not specifically advert to it."' Thus, a legislature's inability to anticipate
the development of transistors would not necessarily exclude them from
the more inclusive intended category of electronic devices.
The failure to distinguish general connotations from specific deno-
tations, a problem which has also plagued other writers, may be due in
part to the view that interpretation, with which it is apparently assumed
any concept of legislative intention or meaning raust be coextensive,
necessarily includes application, with its immediate problem of specific
denotation."8 Radin's fifth point also falsely implies that the draftsman
of a statute would, if he could, advert to specific future factual situa-
tions. Although legislation is usually prompted by specific past situa-
tions, legislative draftsmen. almost inevitably address their words to
classes of events. It is not only impossible for them to envision the
specifics of particular future events, but wholly unnecessary. In any
event, to deny that the legislator's utterance of general conditions on
future behavior is a proper part of the legislative function is to deny
that guidance and the establishment of workable frames of reference
on which reasonable expectations can be built are z.mong the functions
of the legal order.
Radin's sixth and final point is that the traditional view that looks
for subjective legislative intent is undercut by the equally traditional
view that the court may not go beyond the plain w'ords of the statute
and thus needs no help from any separate concept of legislative intent.
But while some of his premises may be true, Radin seems to rely on two
that are both unannounced and false: first, that the words of the statute
are unrelated to the subjective legislative intent that lies behind it; and
second, that any supposed legislative intent stands apart from the statute
and competes with it. Moreover, he ignores the fact that the "plain
meaning" approach, however formulated, is at least partly a separation-
of-powers device to remind judges of their prime responsibility to policy
set by another branch of government.
In the meantime, the expression "legislative intent" remains pro-
fessionally d~classe among many law professors and judges. Supporting
this position is the undeniable fact that it has often been used, as Dean
Landis pointed out, to conceal judicial lawmaking." That the concept
28 MacCallum, supra note 16, at 772.
29 This point is discussed at some length in ch. 3 of the author's forthcoming book,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLIcATIoN OF STATUTES.
30 Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HAv. L. R-v. 886, 891 (1930).
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has been abused does not, however, deny its importance as a fundamental
presupposition of the legislative process.
That the concept of legislative intent is much more alive than the
currently limited use of its normal label might suggest is revealed by the
extent to which those who purport to shun it may be found resorting to
euphemisms to describe it. Indeed, experience suggests that we can
hardly get along without it." An example is the protest of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, long an avowed nonbeliever in subjective legislative in-
tent, 2 that the majority of the Supreme Court in a 1958 tax case failed
to take adequate account of the conference report. "Our problem," he
said, "is not what do ordinary English words mean, but what did Con-
gress mean them to mean." 3 Even Radin, in the article in which he
partly recanted on the uses of legislative history, acknowledged the
existence of legislative subjectivity when he said that the legislature
may "foreclose any attempt by the administration and judiciary to dis-
place what- the legislature regards as the more important of the purposes
to be achieved."3 If hundreds of men can subjectively "regard" some-
thing, it may not strain credulity to conclude that they could also
"intend" it.
Despite occasional protestations to the contrary, the typical lawyer
or judge continues to refer to legislative intent, even though it remains
a matter of inference and conjecture.3 So long as the concept is used
with reasonable restraint, the art of statutory interpretation is undoubt-
edly the better for it.
More than that, the concept is indispensable. The postulation of
some actual, though not directly knowable, legislative intent underlies
the very idea of a legislative process. 8 If legislative intent in the sub-
jective sense does not exist in at least some degree, the legislative pro-
31 This goes especially for the scavengers of legislative history. See Jones, Statutory
Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 957, 968 (1940). See also Horack,
The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 340-41 (1949).
32 Frankfurter, supra note 8, at 528.
38 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 95 (1958) (emphasis
added).
34 Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HAzv. L. Rxv. 388, 412 (1942) (emphasis
added). And if a legislature is incapable of "intending," how is it that a statute can
"strive to attain"? Id. at 408.
" SUTHRLMAND § 45.05.
386 Landis, supra note 30, at 887. If legislative intent
is looked upon as a common agreement on the purpose of an enactment and a
general understanding of the kind of situation at which it is aimed, to deny the
existence of a legislative intention is to deny the existence of a legislative func-
tion.
Note, A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52
CoLI m. L. REv. 125, 126 (1952).
[Vol. 50:206
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cess is blatant nonsense unworthy of serious investigation. Even if there
were no actual legislative intent, judicial deference to the constitutional
separation of powers would require the courts to act as if there were,37
because the concept is necessary to put courts in an appropriately deferen-
tial frame of mind. This alone would be enough to moot the general
issue of its "existence."
Nor should we be deterred from postulating subjective intent by
the baffling problem finding the most practicable, most reliable, and
fairest constitutional means of inferring it. Because in drawing in-
ferences of meaning the human mind is limited to objective manifes-
tations of intent, the problem is to choose the most appropriate means
to that end. That none is completely reliable does not indicate that the
job is impossible or that the attempt must be fruitless. Under our
system of constitutional government, the court has no choice; it must
do its best. That it may often fail only increases tl-ie legislature's incen-
tive to minimize the chances of misreading by making its legislative
message as clear as possible.
If this analysis is sound, it is reasonable to talk generally about
actual subjective legislative intent, so long as we realize that its scope
is limited and our access to it is at best imperfect. Otherwise, we reduce
the legislative process to absurdity and expose statutory law to the risk
that the social views of the court will displace the constitutionally ex-
pressed social views of the legislature.
The real danger in the concept of subjective legislative intent is
that too much is often claimed for it. Its limitations are discussed in
the next section.
Besides putting the court in the proper deferential frame of mind,
the concept of actual legislative intent furnishes the general criteria of
relevance and reliability necessary to determining what specific elements
in the statute and its context should be taken into account and the respec-
tive weights that they should be given. On what other basis, for example,
could a court properly evaluate extrinsic materials?
The Limitations of Legislative In rent
That there is some actual and reasonably inferable legislative intent
behind every statute does not mean that there is always, or even often, a
specific legislative intent with respect to the particular issue in question,
38
37 "[A] fiction, however weak it may prove to be upon logical analysis, is created
from sheer necessity." MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in Present
Day Law Practice, 3 VAND. L. REv. 369, 371-72 (1950).
38 Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REv. 737, 742 (1940);
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or, ff there is only a general relevant intent, that it resolves the issue.
Acting through a few legislators, a legislature, even while conscious of
the broad legislative problem, usually adverts to some of its specific
aspects without adverting to all. That the courts often deal with matters
with respect to which specific legislative intent is either nonexistent or
imperfectly revealed may explain why many persons distrust the general
concept itself.
Moreover, actual intent, whether specific or general, normally can-
not keep abreast of expressed intent (meaning). An author inevitably
encompasses in what he says more than he had specifically in mind"9
and often encompasses even more than he had generally in mind."0
Thus, to this limited extent we can agree with Kohler that "the idea
contained in [the written text] has a life of its own independent of the
person who thinks or expresses it.""' The fact was noted in Chapman
v. Brown,'2 a products liability case. On the other hand, the limiting
force of context exemplified in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States43 fortifies the courts against the risk that this "life of its own"
will carry the statute too far.
At the same time, we must read statutes as if actual intent and
manifest intent coincided, because in the long run we can approximate
actual intent more reliably under that assumption than under any other.4 '
Short of extrasensory perception, there appears to be no alternative.
This compels the interpreter to presume in all cases what he knows to be
true only in most. The interpreter must, therefore, assume that the
actual intended meaning coincides with the manifest intended meaning
until the user clarifies his message by restating it, whereupon the same
kind of problem is presented in a new, and presumably dearer, form.
One reason for restraint in pursuing legislative intent is that, once
the reliable manifestations of the intent behind a statute have been ex-
Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 382,
388 (1950).
89 "1 cannot believe that any of us would say that the 'meaning' of an utterance is
exhausted by the specific content of the utterer's mind at the moment." L. HAND, THFE
BILL OF RIGHTS 18-19 (1958). See also E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS
OF THE LAW 203 (1953) ; MacCallum, supra note 16, at 772-74.
40 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593,
627-28 (1958) ; E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 27 (1953) ;
Kohler, Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 187, 188
(1921).
4Id. at 195.
42 198 F. Supp. 78, 118 (D. Hawaii 1961) ("those who drafted this law may not
have fully realized the extent of the exception expressly recognized by this section..
43 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
44 It is the very nature of language to reflect prevailing usage.
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amined and weighed, it is idle to speculate on the sweep of actual intent
in the specific instance. Although it is necessary to assume a general
legislative intent to give direction and significance to statutory interpreta-
tion, a court's bases for inferring what is presumed to be the particular
intent respecting the issue before it are necessarily limited to the statute
and appropriate extrinsic materials. Any residual inconsistency between
manifest intent and actual intent remains one for unverifiable specula-
tion."' Lawyers, who are no more capable than philosophers or psycho-
logists in this respect, should therefore limit themselves to these signifi-
cant questions: What legislative materials are entitled to what weight?
What inferences of actual intent can most plausibly be drawn from these
materials?
Some courts have asserted that where legislative meaning is uncer-
tain, legislative intent is useful in removing the uncertainty.," But, if
"intent" means actual specific subjective intent, it can never be helpful,
because it is never directly knowable. Once we assume that the statute
viewed with other reliable indicia of intent leaves a significant, unre-
solved uncertainty, we have by hypothesis exhausted the only objective
evidence from which any specific actual intent can reliably be inferred.
Actual intent as such is no more available at this point to resolve the
uncertainty than it was in the first instance. Tf ere is nothing left
except searching out external manifestations of intent of doubtful reli-
ability.
To say that in cases of uncertainty legislative intent is helpful in
ascertaining statutory meaning is to put the matter exactly backwards,
if "legislative intent" means actual subjective intent. Rather, statutory
meaning is helpful in ascertaining subjective legislative intent. Indeed,
there is no other way to get at such intent. The main problem is to
determine what expressions of meaning are appropriate to look at.
On the other hand, if "legislative intent" means manifest intent,
there is a limited sense in which it may sometimes help to resolve a par-
ticular uncertainty of meaning. If the statute is plainly intended to deal
with all of what appears to be a unified problem, some of whose aspects
lie outside a literal reading of the statute, and that, if not dealt with in
45 "Even assuming the existence in any case of an actual legi;lative intention different
from any sensible textual meaning, it is pure speculation to atte!mpt to say what it is."
De Sloovre, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 538, 541 (1934).
Competing inferences from other sources suffer from the same inherent uncertainty.
46 See, e.g., Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1968). The converse of this is the notion that "(i]t is onlyr when the language of
the statute or ordinance is ambiguous that the courts should search for legislative intent."
Ott v. Johnson, - Ind. - , 319 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1974).
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its other aspects, would provide a means of undermining what the
statute clearly tries to accomplish, and if the words of the statute are
capable of bearing a meaning that covers these additional aspects, there
is presumably a legislative purpose to deal with the whole problem and
not merely a less manageable part of it. It can also be presumed that the
words were intended to carry a meaning coextensive with that purpose.
This, indeed, was the gist of Heydon's Case.4"
However, what the tireless pursuers of legislative intent have in
effect been saying is that, where some evidences of intent (usually the
statute) do not clear up the uncertainty, other evidences (usually legis-
lative history) may. The practical danger in pursuing actual legisla-
tive intent is the temptation to pursue it relentlessly, under the misappre-
hension that if the interpreter looks at enough evidence, actual intent
will sooner or later become directly knowable.48 Thus he is tempted to
press beyond the reliable and otherwise appropriate evidences of intent
to those that are so unreliable or otherwise inappropriate that, even
though relevant, they should be rejected. This is the problem that haunts
the scavengers of legislative history. No matter how far he wanders,
the searcher always ends with having to infer specific intent from objec-
tive writings of varying reliability and accessibility. 9
47 3 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584).
P. Heymann, Ice Cream at Harvard Square, but No Vehicles in the Park-A Study
of Purposes, 1960, at 13, 14 (unpublished paper in Harvard Law School Library) makes
this perceptive observation:
For the context of purposes creates a field of forces in which a very unusual
meaning for a word may be clearly "meant." "Empty the baskets" may be
clearly meant to include a pile of discarded paper on the floor next to a full
waste basket.
Suppose in the face of a case like Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 507-
08, 267 A.2d 867, 870-71 (1970), holding that a hospital that administers blood infected
with hepatitis virus might be strictly liable whether or not a transfusion is a "sale" or a
"service," a state legislature enacts a statute either declaring that a blood transfusion is
a "service" rather than a "sale," e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1970),
or killing "warranties" in such a case, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (Supp.
1974). A court faced with such a "service" statute is likely to read it as impliedly for-
bidding the court to attach a warranty to the transfusion if it is treated as a
"service." Shepherd v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 610, 109 Cal. Rptr.
132, 134 (1973). Similarly, a court faced with a "warranty" statute is likely to read it
as impliedly forbidding the court to impose "strict liability in tort," which many courts
treat as distinct from warranty. McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 352 F. Supp. 690,
691 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
48 See, e.g., Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1968) ; id. at 1019 (Thornberry, J., concurring specially).
49 "[S]ubjective intention must always be determined by inferences from objective
manifestations . . . ." Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by
Extrinsic Evidence, 20 B.U.L. Rxv. 601, 607 (1940), reprinted in 3 SUTHERLAND 609, 614
(1974).
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For purposes of cognition,"0 there is also the problem of constitu-
tionality. The only legally effective way to express the legislative will is
to enact a statute," and a court should not subvert this principle by treat-
ing as coequal with the statute statements such as those found in legis-
lative hearings or even committee reports, or by treating as part of
proper legislative context materials that fall outside it. At best, the
legislative intent that can be reliably inferred from materials falling
outside proper context is appropriate only for its confirmatory value.
For purposes of judicial creation," on the other hand, examining reli-
able materials that fall outside proper context may be helpful.
The practical issue, therefore, is not whether to infer subjective
intent or not, but how to select and evaluate the avalable evidence. This
is the significant problem of "legislative intent," and it is unfortunate
that it has been obscured by misgivings over its "existence."
Objective Versus Subjective Interpretation
It is common to classify approaches to interpreting statutes as either
"objective" or "subjective."'" This dichotomy is usually explained in
terms of whether the pursuer of meaning is preoccupied with the statute
itself (an objective legal writing) or with the actual, and therefore
subjective, intent of the legislature. On the other hand, if we look at
actions rather than claims, we find that the judicial working distinction
is, instead, between disregarding legislative histor) and taking it into
account." That the latter distinction has nothing to do with whether
the approach is objective or subjective becomes clear when we realize
that the objective writings that comprise legislative history are no closer
to actual, subjective states of mind than the objective writings that com-
prise statutes." Indeed, in relevance and reliability, they may be even
5OThe ascertainment (i.e., discovery) of meaning; interpretation in the authentic
sense.
51 "[T]he constitutional power granted to Congress to legislate is granted only if it
is exercised in the form of voting on specific statutes." Radin, A Case Study in Statu-
tory Interpretation: Western Union Co. v. Lenroot, 33 CALIF. L. Rxv. 218, 223 (1945).
And see E. C vAwroRD, THE CoNsTRucTION OF STATUTES 58-59 (1940) ; 1 SUTHERLAND §
1.02 (1972).
r2 Either (1) judicial lawmaking in supplementation of a statute through the assign-
ment of meaning, or (2) judicial lawmaking by analogy with the statute.
53 E.g., A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 121-22 (1959) ; Bi.hin, The Law Finders:
An Essay i;n Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1965) ; Lenhoff, On Inter-
pretative Theories: A Comparative Study in Legislation, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 312, 326
(1949) ; Thornstedt, The Principle of Legality and Teleological Construction of Statutes
in Criminal Law, in 4 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 209, 228-2-9 (1960).
"4 "The difference depends on the data that are taken into consideration in the in-
terpretation." A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 121-22 (1959).
"5 See note 49 supra.
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farther removed.
The same confusion exists among those who, although foregoing
any distinction between "objective" and "subjective," nevertheless iden-
tify the search for legislative intent with the examination of legislative
history. For example, the California Assembly's special 1962 task
group, although called the "Subcommittee on Legislative Intent," con-
cerned itself almost entirely with analyzing legislative history." This
preoccupation seemed to imply that an interpreter who is dedicated to
discovering legislative intent cannot successfully pursue it without con-
sulting at least some legislative history. Ironically, such an approach
means consulting interpretative materials, which, although identified
with legislative meaning, are for the most part unreliable, or purposive
materials, which, although more reliable, relate only indirectly to in-
tended meaning.
Apart from constitutional considerations, belief in the existence
and significance of legislative intent involves no commitment to examin-
ing any specific kind of evidence. It involves only a commitment to
ascertaining intent by inference from an examination of appropriate text
and context. There is certainly no constitutional obligation to consult
inappropriate evidence.
Appropriateness has two aspects. The factual aspect involves fidelity
to normal principles of communication, which are presupposed by the
constitutional system.57 The constitutional aspect involves the prescrip-
tion that only a statute can carry the direct force of legislative law."'
Other factors are excluded except so far as they qualify as proper
context.
56 Final Report of the Subcommittee on Legislative Intent of the Assembly Commit-
tee on Rules, 28 Assembly Interim Committee Reports 1961-1963, No. 1, California Legis-
lature. "[I]ntention is a residuary clause intended to gather up whatever other aids there
may be to interpretation beside the particular words and the dictionary." O.W. Holmes,
letter quoted in Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
Rxv. 527, 538 (1947).
57 [Courts] cannot permit the legislative process, and all the other processes
which depend on the integrity of language, to be subverted by the misuse of
words.
H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1412, 1413 (tent. ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as HART & SACKS].
And see notes 58 & 59 infra.
58 See Radin, A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation: Western Union Co. v. Len-
root, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 218, 223 (1945); see also E. CRAwFoaD, THE CONSTR CTION OF
STATUTES 58-59 (1940); 1 SUTHERLAND § 1.02 (1972).
Although the United States Constitution is not express on the point, the limitation
appears to be nailed down, through negative implication, by the enactment procedure pre-
scribed by article I, section 7. As for the states, about half their constitutions provide,
in effect, that "no law may be enacted except by bill," and the same limitation seems to
inhere, by negative implication, in the enactment procedure prescribed by the others.
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Thus, an honest and persistent search for the corporate intent of
the legislature is a search for legislative intent only as it has been con-
stitutionally expressed. There is no inconsistency between seeking legis-
lative intent and refusing to look for it in places that are constitutionally
off-limits.
Summary
If this analysis is correct, we may assume (1) that behind every
statute and the implications that it generates there is an actual, but not
wholly determinable, legislative intent that provides its impetus and
significance; (2) that the best working approximation of this actual
intent is the intent that it is most plausible to infer from the appropriate
objective manifestation of intent, which is, in the case of cognition, the
statute as read in its proper context and, in the case of creation, the
statute as read in its proper context supplemented by other relevant and
reliable extrinsic evidence; (3) that, although there are frequent devia-
tions of manifest intent from actual intent, there is no known way to
measure these deviations; (4) that manifest intent, in addition to de-
viating to an unknowable extent from actual intent, often conveys mean-
ing to the typical reader that transcends to an unkrowable extent what
the legislature generally intended; and (5) that, despite this, there is
no practical alternative to assuming that the manifest intent is the
actual intent, until new appropriate evidence is available or the legisla-
ture enacts a corrective amendment.
From this analysis, we may also assume that the most important
function of the concept of subjective legislative intent is to put the judge
or other interpreter in a proper, deferential frame of mind vis-i-vis
the legislature. Its second most important function is to help the inter-
6o "The courts have no institutional obligation to enforce the words of committeemen,
if the words are not found in the statutory text." Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay
in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 16 (1965).
[T]hese policies of clear statement may on occasion operate to defeat the actual,
consciously held intention of particular legislators, or of the members of the leg-
islature generally. . . . [I]n other words, they constitute conditions of the ef-
fectual exercise of legislative power. But the requirement should be thought of
as constitutionally imposed.
HART & SACKS at 1412-13. "[L]egislative intention established by extrinsic aids is ir-
relevant unless reasonably consistent with the words of the ena:tment. . . . Certainly
it is not true in practice that legislative intention is given effect wherever possible."
Nutting, supra note 49, at 609-10. In addition,
provided that the interpretation is reasonable, . . . taking a manifestation
which in itself is an expression of intention and applying to its interpretation a
standard other than one which is purely subjective . . . ma have a tendency to
encourage careful and precise drafting on the part of the legislature.
Id. at 613-14.
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preter select and weigh the many elements of statutory language and
legislative context by giving him a general criterion of reliability. On
the other hand, it is useless for clearing up statutory uncertainties that
remain after the appropriate manifestations of intent have been ex-
hausted.
PART II: LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
"[T]he 'policy' of a statute should be drawn out of its
terms, as nourished by their proper environment, and not, like
nitrogen, out of the air."6"
Relation to Legislative Intent; Terminology
Whereas the concept of "legislative intent" is in disfavor with many
writers, that of "legislative purpose" enjoys not only favor but pre-
eminence.6 For most, it is the touchstone of statutory interpretation.
It is important, therefore, to distinguish it from legislative intent and
examine it in some detail.
In their widest senses the two concepts overlap. Thus, if it may be
said that when a legislature took particular action it had a range of ever-
widening purposes, beginning at the inner extreme with the specific
purpose of taking that action and ending at the outer extreme with the
very general purpose of helping to advance the total public good, the
former is coextensive with the legislative intent to effectuate the specific
purpose.12  The important fact is that lawyers tend to identify the
immediate legislative purpose with "legislative intent" and to reserve
the term "legislative purpose" for any broader or remote ("ulterior")
legislative purpose.
Thus, in general legal usage the word "intent" coincides with the
particular immediate purpose that the statute intended to directly ex-
60 D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121-22 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
61 "Though the intention of the legislature is a fiction, the purpose or object of the
legislation is very real. . . . Though real, it is not always easily discoverable . .. ."
Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO LJ. 286,
292 (1936). See also MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in Present Day
Law Practice, 3 VAlND. L. Rxv. 369, 372 (1950); Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56
HARV. L. Rav. 388, 398, 400 n.20; Thomas, Statutory Construction when Legislation Is
Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARv. J. LEGis. 191, 201, 204 (1966) ; Witherspoon,
Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Middle Road": I, 40
TEXAS L. REV. 751, 789-805 (1962). "Legislative purposes also include those at work in
the field of law to which the statute belongs." Id. at 826. This is an aspect of general
legislative context that needs further study.
62 See Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 H~Av. L. Rav.
370, 371 (1947) ; Landis, supra note 30, at 888.
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press and immediately accomplish, whereas the word "purpose" refers
primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute
to accomplish or help to accomplish. Although some ulterior purposes,
like the immediate purpose, tend to be fully served by the statute in
the sense that compliance with its working provisions will fully carry
them out, most ulterior purposes are broad enough that they can be
only partly served by such compliance.
Even with these qualifications the concept of "purpose" presents no
wholly new element, because, if revealed to the legislative audience, it
is part of the proper context of the statute, which nmust be considered in
ascertaining its meaning. Indeed, as an integrating factor it is often the
most important part of that context. Here, we will discuss only the
extent to which legislative purpose exists, how it is to be determined,
and how it is related to the ascertainment of meaning.
The distinction between immediate legislative purpose and ulterior
legislative purpose is both valid and useful (only ulterior purpose can be
part of context). Although there is some question whether marking
that distinction with the words "intent" and "purpose" does not tend to
obscure their close affinity, the following analysis will honor semantic
convention by using "purpose" for the most part as including only
ulterior purpose.
Limitations of Legislative Purpose
The basic problems of legislative purpose are similar to those of
legislative intent. Does the legislature have an actual legislative purpose
when it enacts a statute? Is that purpose useful in clearing up uncer-
tainties of meaning? If so, how can we reliably find out what it is?
Again, we must distinguish between the subjective and the objec-
tive; that is, between the purpose that the legislature (or at least some
legislators) actually had in mind and the purpose, if any, that is revealed
by the statute and the other evidence that a court may properly consider.
Wherever subjectivity poses a problem of ascertaining legislative intent,
it poses a problem of ascertaining legislative purpose.
So far as legislative purpose (in the literal sense) coincides with
legislative intent, answers have already been given."' So far as it con-
sists (in its narrower legal sense) of ulterior purposes, the answer to
the question whether subjective legislative purpose exists is that there is
often a real consensus among those most closely responsible for the bill
on a purpose that the bill is designed to help achieve.
683 See part I of this article.
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There may even be a congeries of purposes. 4 For example, the
legislative intent to lower the minimum age at which men may contract
marriage may reflect the purposes of removing a discrepancy between
men's majority for marriage purposes in that jurisdiction and their
comparable status in another; of removing a discrepancy between men's
majority for marriage purposes and their majority for voting purposes;
and of removing a discrepancy between the rights of men and those
of women. It may also include the broader and more remote purposes
of achieving a better balanced social system and of attracting political
support for its proponents. There may be other purposes. That these
purposes may not comprise a neat and logical hierarchy reflects, as
Professor Lenhoff has suggested, "the compromising nature of the
democratic process."6
Moreover, legislative purposes may or may not be shared. As
between individual legislators, they may even be inconsistent."8 In such
a case, it is hard to say which is "the" legislative purpose.
The reasons for supposing an actual consensus on legislative purpose
are sometimes stronger, but usually weaker, than they are on legislative
intent."' True, it is sometimes easier for a group of persons subjec-
tively to share the same general purpose than it is for .them subjectively
84E. PATTERSON, LAW IN A SCIENTIFIc AGE 26, 52 (1963). See also HART & SACKS
at 1414 ("hierarchies or constellationt" of purposes) ; Radin at 876; Witherspoon, Admin-
istrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Middle Road": I, 40 TEXAS
L. REv. 751, 796-800 (1962).
85A. LENHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 631
(1949).
186 2A SUTHERLAND § 48.17.
A statute as a statement of purpose is limited in its generality by the actual and
possibly conflicting purposes of the legislature. This is not very different from
saying that the words of a statute express the legislature's optimum reconciliation
in general terms of its positive desires and negative aversions.
P. Heymann, Ice Cream at Harvard Square, but No Vehicles in the Park-A Study of
Purposes, 1960, at 37 (unpublished paper in Harvard Law School Library). See also
Wasby, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation, 12 J. PUB. LAw 264
(1963).
87 "It is not much easier to learn about the general purposes of legislators than to
learn about the specific intentions of legislators." MacCallum, supra note 16, at 780.
Cf. Professor Jones' statement:
[T]he purpose or policy embodied in a statute . . . is more often discoverable
than . . . an understanding of legislators as to technical meaning or specific
application. A greater number of the members of a legislative body are likely to
be aware of, and to put themselves on record as to, the purposes underlying a
legislative proposal ....
Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. Rnv. 737, 761 (1940). How-
ever, the important questions are not how many legislators are talking and how much of
their talk is about legislative purposes, but which ones are closest to the bill and how
their attention is focused. This focus is more likely to be on the immediate legislative
purpose (meaning) than on a particular ulterior purpose.
[Vol. 50:206
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
to share the same intent. But, although this might make the supposition
of an actual legislative purpose more palatable to some of the skeptics
of subjective legislative intent, there are countervailing considerations.
The disciplines of the legislative process are directed more to attain-
ing agreement on the specific action to be taken in a bill" than to at-
taining agreement on its legislative purposes, even when these purposes
have been memorialized in the bill itself. Even those who are closest
to the bill are likely to focus more sharply on the specific action taken
in the bill than on any general statements of purpose." Other legislators,
whose knowledge of the bill tends to be general only, are likely to have
their own notions of the purposes that it will serve and not so likely,
therefore, to adopt the states of mind of others. Indeed, even those who
are closely familiar with the specific terms of the bill may agree on the
same specific action for a variety of reasons." As a result, there is
likely to be less actual agreement on specific ultimate objectives than
there is on the action taken in the bill itself. This may explain why most
formal statements of purpose in bills or committee reports tend to be
innocuous generalities designed to offend the least number of people, a
fact that destroys most of their usefulness for resolving specific uncer-
tainties of meaning. As a general result, there are likely to be fewer
reliable evidences of legislative purpose than there are to be of legisla-
tive intent. Indeed, there may be no discernible ulterior legislative pur-
pose at all. As Professor Radin has pointed out, a 3tatute may have no
discoverable purpose beyond what the statute itself expressly reveals"
and immediately effectuates.
This is not to say that actual legislative purpose does not usually
eB "[W]henever a law is adopted, all that is really agreed uron is the words." Koh-
ler, Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law, in SCIENCE OF J-EGAL METHOD 187, 196
(1921).
49 Cf. Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1, 21 (1965).
To p. Heymann, Ice Cream at Harvard Square, but No Vehicles in the Park-A
Study of Purposes, 1960, at 13-14 (unpublished paper in Harvard Law School Library).
Nashville & K. R.R. Co. v. Davis, 78 S.W. 1050 (Tenn. 1902), involved the question
whether geese were covered by a statute requiring train engineers to take evasive action
when an "animal or obstruction" appeared on the track. In view of the doubt that a
goose could be either an "animal" or an "obstruction," the purlxses of the statute were
a critical factor. If its purpose was merely to protect animals or their owners, the ques-
tion whether the kind of animal in question was an obstruction was irrelevant, but the
question whether or not it was a wild animal could be important. If its purpose was
merely to protect passengers and employees operating a train or to protect the operators
of railroads and their property, the risk that a goose or geese might derail or othenvise
damage a train likewise would be important. The court decided the case on the assump-
tion that the statute was directed only to "obstructions." Yet, the question remains:
what were its purposes and how were they ascertained?
71 Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388, 423 (1942).
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exist, or that there is no reliable basis .for inferring it. Rather, it says
that the elements that have made the concept of subjective legislative
intent unacceptable to many exist in many cases to an even greater
degree for subjective legislative purpose. In the face of these consider-
ations, it is ironic that the amorphous and elusive "legislative intent"
has been spurned by many in favor of the even more amorphous and
elusive "legislative purpose."
We come now to the general question of how subjective legisla-
tive purpose is to be determined.
Ascertainment of Legislative Purpose
Whether we search for actual legislative purpose or for actual
legislative intent, we can only infer it from external materials. Unfor-
tunately, in the ascertainment of legislative purpose it cannot always be
assumed that there is in fact such a purpose or, if there is, that there is
reliable evidence of it. For most state legislatures, there is only the
statute and the backdrop of proper context. The statute normally in-
dudes no preamble or purpose clause, and there is little recorded legis-
lative history. Even where they exist, there is no assurance that either
will be relevant.
As with legislative intent, the danger in presuming an actual legis-
lative purpose beyond what is expressly or impliedly revealed is that
the interpreter will either attribute to the statute a purpose of his own
contriving or search for actual purpose so relentlessly that he goes be-
yond the limits of the appropriate available evidence. Because the
reliable indicia of any purpose are more likely to be found beyond the
mere words of the statute, the temptation to scavenge among the
materials of legislative history is at least as great here as it is for legis-
lative intent.
If this analysis is sound, merely to switch from "intent" in the sense
,of immediate legislative purpose to "purpose" in the sense of broader. or
-ulterior legislative purpose solves few of the problems that have been
supposed to make the concept of legislative intent unworkable and unten-
able. Instead, the limitations and pitfalls increase. If the concept of
subjective legislative intent is inappropriate, that of subjective legis-
lative purpose is a fortiori inappropriate. Thus, the use of legislative
purpose should be considered as an application, on a broader and less
reliable front, of principles that apply with sharper focus, greater inten-
sity,, and greater reliability to the kind of legiglative purpose that is
identified with "legislative intent."
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Nor can we avoid the problem of reliable irference by pursuing
objective statements or other evidences of purpose in disregard of the
likelihood that they reflect actual legislative states of mind. Otherwise,
we would have no adequate guide to the relevant and reliable manifesta-
tions to which a search for legislative purpose should be limited.
That the subjective aspects of legislative purpose tend to be more
diffuse and elusive than those of the immediate purpose voiced by the
statute itself is not critical, because in both instances they are inferable
from objective evidence. The significant difference is that, however
necessary, inferences of actual legislative purpose that make up manifest
legislative purpose can in general be drawn with less confidence than
those of actual legislative intent.
Judicial Bootstrap Pulling
Because the need to draw inferences of legislative purpose is less
compelling and because the reliability of such -inferences tends to be
less, the danger of inventing fictitious and fanciful legislative purposes
is correspondingly greater. This does not mean that the concept of a
legislative, as distinct from a general social or judicial, purpose must
be repudiated. It means only that the objective of discovering a real
legislative purpose must be pursued with greater caution.
In Johnson v. United States,'7 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit had to decide whether Rev. Stat. 1874 § 860,11 which provided
that: "No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained
from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding . . . shall
be given in evidence ...against him ... in any criminal proceeding,"
applied to a schedule in bankruptcy. Although Judge Holmes found
that such a schedule fell outside the words of the statute, he found that
it came within its purpose, which he said "was to prevent the required
steps of the written procedure in court preliminary to trial from being
used against the party for whom they were filed."74
Where did Holmes find that purpose? The statute included no
statement of purpose, and the usual kind of legislative history was either
unavailable or not consulted. All he had to go on, beyond the words
of the statute, was the general material of proper context. Most helpful
was the Bankruptcy Act, in the light of which the schedule in bankruptcy
was seen as generally analogous to a pleading. As with legislative intent,
the manifest purpose is presumed to be the actual purpose.
72 163 F. 30 (lst Cir. 1908).
73Act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. (pt. 1) 162, since repealed.
74 163 F. at 32.
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Because the specific formulation of purpose was Holmes's, how
could he be reasonably sure that he was stating a purpose that Congress
would recognize as its own? Or was he merely creating a sensible
policy, well served by the clear elements of the statute, that he could
thereafter use to interpret more broadly what was otherwise narrow
language? Although the result was probably sensible and fair, can it be
supported as something cognitively discoverable from the statute and
its proper context? Or was it in significant aspects a judicial purpose
that Holmes himself assigned to the statute? So far as it may have
been the latter, the result must be sustained, not as the ascertainment of
statutory meaning, but ag an act of judicial lawmaking.
As a result, the concept of a legislative purpose, despite its frequent
usefulness, provides a strong temptation to perform the bootstrap opera-
tion of formulating a "legislative purpose" with one eye on the situation
to which it is to be applied. While this is an appropriate way to pour the
foundation for a judicial rule of law, it is of doubtful propriety and
candor when the result is supposedly controlled by the independent pur-
poses of the legislature.
Although Judge Hand has described interpretation as the "prolifera-
tion of purpose,"7 Justice Frankfurter notes that in the hands of "judges
intellectually less disciplined than Judge Hand ... it might justify in-
terpretations by judicial libertines, not merely judicial libertarians."7
On a later occasion, he added that judicial construction ought "to stick
close to what the legislature says and not draw prodigally upon unfor-
mulated purposes or directions."'7  There is reason to believe that
Justice Frankfurter's fears have often been realized.7"
75 Quoted in Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUm. L.
Rxv. 527, 529 (1947).
761d.
77 Frankfurter, Foreword, A S-ymposium on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV.
365, 367 (1950). In an apparent attempt to minimize the pitfalls of seeking actual, sub-
jective legislative purpose, Hart and Sacks use the more objective-sounding expression
"purpose which ought to be attributed to a statute." HART & SACKs at 1414. Read
literally, this suggests that they may be supporting the assignment, in some cases, of a
legislative purpose that is insupportable on any theory of cognition. If so, the approach
might be rationalized as a legitimate aspect of judicial lawmaking if it is used to effectu-
ate the most satisfactory accommodation with the rest of the legal order. However, the
fact that the authors use their concept as a tool for "inferring purpose" suggests that
they are talking about cognition, not creation. This, of course, presupposes a search
for actual purpose.
78 There is a danger that this emphasis on the purpose of the enactment itself
might overshadow the generic purposes of legislation, which is after all designed
for communication to the public at large. Thus where the terms of a statute are
allowed to deviate repeatedly and significantly from their meaning in common
parlance, public trust and confidence in written enactments might be hurt.
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Legislative Purpose as an Aid to Interpretation
On the usefulness of legislative purpose to legilative interpretation,
Professor Llewellyn has said, "If a statute is to make sense, it must be
read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a
rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense."79 Professors Hart and
Sacks have inquired whether it is not true that "[t]he meaning of a
statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible purpose."'8
If, as each quoted statement suggests, "purpose" is used in its
usual legal sense of ulterior purpose, such statements are simply not
true, because, as Professor Radin has pointed out, a statute may have no
discoverable purpose." Here the meaning of the statute and its revealed
legislative intent are the same thing. Nor are they necessarily obscure.
That the court can, on its own initiative, view the evidence of legislative
intent in the light of a judicial purpose does not imply that the legisla-
ture shared that purpose. Nor is the necessity of postulating a legisla-
tive purpose implied in the fact that for most statutes it is reasonable to
suppose that the legislature in fact had a purpose ulterior to its legislative
intent.
If, instead, such statements refer only to the immediate purpose
embedded in legislative intent, they dissolve into tautology. A statute
whose only discoverable purpose is that fully realized by the statute
itself is no more or less intelligible than the revelation of immediate
purpose that constitutes its meaning. The statements are therefore true,
but only by definition. Their main value is that they imply that all com-
mands, prohibitions, and other legislative communica.tions are purposive
acts that should be approached as such, thus putting the court and other
readers in a deferential frame of mind.
Llewellyn's statement goes beyond tautology to self-contradiction,
because no statute is 100 percent gibberish and every statute necessarily
implies the minimum purpose of accomplishing what it purports to say.
A statute without even the purpose of enacting the legal rule that it pre-
scribes (whatever that may be assumed to be) could hardly be imagined.
That what the statute says may lack clarity of meaning and thus clarity
G. Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice, 1961, at 209 (unpublished dissertation in Harvard Law
School Library).79 Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950). Fuller,
Positivimn and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630, 664
(1958) : "[1]s it really ever possible to interpret a word in a statute without knowing
the aim of the statute?"80 HART & SACKS at 1157.
81 See note 71 supra & text accompanying.
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of purpose does not necessarily reduce it to "nonsense."
For legislative purposes, Professor Lenhoff's statement seems more
satisfactory: "The purpose of a statute is certainly an excellent guide
for the discovery of the legislative intent." 2 This asserts, not the neces-
sity of such a purpose, but its utility if it exists.
Immediate purpose, on the other hand, is ordinarily useless for
determining legislative intent because, being coextensive with legislative
intent, it is merely another way of describing the problem. However, as
pointed out in the preceding part,8" there is a sense in which impliedly
revealed immediate purpose is occasionally helpful, and this is undoubt-
edly what Llewellyn and Hart and Sacks were driving at. This is the
case in which proper context strongly suggests that the actual legislative
intent was modestly broader or narrower than what the literal meaning
of the statute directly supports.
On this basis, the statements of Llewellyn and of Hart and Sacks
might have been more accurate had they read,
Every statute represents an attempt to accomplish an im-
mediate legislative purpose, presumably an intelligible one. The
purpose is coextensive with the legislative intent and, so far as
it is discoverable from the statute and its proper context, it cor-
responds also to its legislative meaning.
However, the usefulness of a particular legislative purpose for un-
locking legislative intent (and thus legislative meaning) normally exists
only when it is truly ulterior, because, with the exception noted, it
can illumine only what is not identical with it."4 Unfortunately, the
broader the legislative purpose, the less likely that it will illumine the
specific problems raised by the text. The value of an express purpose is
that it reduces judicial speculation.
Once legislative purpose has been reliably ascertained, the only
remaining problem is to determine the extent to which the language
used in the statute can sustain a meaning that not only is coextensive or
consistent with that purpose but appears to be the most plausible one
under the circumstances.
Drafting Policy
This analysis may suggest that good draftsmanship calls for the
8 2 A. LuNHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 630
(1949). See also note 70 supra.
83 See cases cited note 47 supra.
84 One aspect of legislative purpose is that it makes relevant the probable effect of
the statute. E. CRAWFORD, THE CON STRUCION OF STATUTES 286-90 (1940).
[Vol. 50:206
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
inclusion of a general purpose clause in every statute. Although this is
the practice of some draftsmen, there is usually no reed in a very specific
statute to include a formal purpose clause. 5 There are, however, excep-
tional instances in which there are significant pervasive doubts that
cannot be resolved in the specific working provisions and in which,
therefore, a broad statement of purpose may be helpful to the courts.
These are the unusual cases in which the general thrust of even a well-
drawn statute may not be apparent on its face. ]ut if the draftsman
includes such a clause, he must be careful not to create, by the omission
of other legislative purposes, the misleading impression that they were
not also relevant.
Because general statements of purpose serve best as antidotes to in-
adequate draftsmanship, the draftsman who doubts his own draftsman-
ship would do better to omit any such statement, because the deficiencies
of draftsmanship that infect the working provisions of the bill are likely
also to infect its statement of purpose. Instead, he should let the court
draw its own conclusions about legislative purpose from the evidences
provided by the working provisions and context of the statute. If, on
the other hand, he is sure of his draftsmanship, he is assuming a condi-
tion in which a general purpose clause would not normally be needed.
A general legislative purpose clause may be helpful, however, where
a very general statute in effect delegates lawmaking power to the courts.
Much more effective for the general run of statutes is the piecemeal
approach, under which specific purposes are respectively prefixed, as
needed, to particular commands, authorizations, or prohibitions ("For
the purpose of . . . , the contractor shall .. .").6
Discrepancies Between Purpose and Intent
Suppose that manifest legislative purpose is broader than, or even
A' See Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation o)' Statutes, 60 HARV. L.
REv. 370, 378 (1947). Despite the many adherents of formal purpose clauses, they are
rarely helpful. R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIvE DRAFTING 107-08 (1954); PRoFESSlONALIZ-
ING LEGISLATIVK DRAFTING-THE FEDERA. EXPERIENCE 51, 94, 154 (R. Dickerson ed.
1973).
86 [I]f the Bill is done properly, one does not ordinarily need a purpose clause.
Let me soften that statement somewhat. The best way to do it in most cases is
to fragment your purpose clause and simply say at the beginning of specific sen-
tences, where it is helpful, "To accomplish so-and-so, the Secretary shall" and
so on, or "For the purposes of such-and-such," etc. These fragmented state-
ments of specific purpose are preferable, because they are focused on specific
uncertainties. For example, you might say, "To help reduce population growth,
we prescribe as follows."
R. Dickerson, testimony before the Committee on the Preparation of Legislation (Renton
Committee), United Kingdom, Dec. 12, 1973, at 7-8 (unpublished transcript on file with
author).
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conflicts with, manifest legislative intent. Which should presumably
prevail? Much modern writing suggests the former. 7
I suggest, instead, that the latter should normally prevail. For one
thing, there is little basis in experience for assuming that a legislative
purpose has been precisely and comprehensively articulated. Even if it
has, a legislative affirmation of purpose does not guarantee that it has
in fact been achieved in the working provisions of the statute; the
aspiration may remain at least partly unrealized." Its authors may
even have recognized and accepted the fact.
A statement of legislative purpose cannot be read as decreeing
whatever is necessary to achieve it beyond what can be sustained by the
specific working provisions of the statute when read in the context of
the legislative purpose.89 "This is what we are trying ultimately (or
generally) to accomplish with the help of this act" is certainly not the
same as "This is what we have in fact decreed in this act."
Suppose this statute: "Section 1. The purpose of this act is to
protect the public health. Section 2. No person may dump loose garbage
in the street." This statute does not apply to the contamination of drink-
ing fountains, even though that kind of contamination frustiates the
legislative purpose declared by section 1; the legislature was not trying
in this statute to take every step necessary to protect the public health.
Indeed, it is the essence of a broader legislative purpose that it will not
be wholly fulfilled by the statute in question even if its working provisions
are fully complied with.
On the other hand, the statement of broader ulterior purpose in
section 1 might help resolve doubts of meaning that would otherwise
arise in section 2. For example, section 1 might help the court decide
whether the statute applied to refuse whose threat to health had otherwise
been neutralized. Thus, it might supply the contextual basis for an im-
plied exception or other limitation. Even here, the purpose clause would
not necessarily control, because (1) legislatures often intentionally accept
discrepancies between working provisions and ulterior purposes
in situations where the precise matching of specific mandates to the
87 E.g., Frankfurter, rupra note 75.
88"[A] most sensible starting point certainly is from the question 'what did the
author mean.' We may perhaps conclude that he did not accomplish what he intended
to accomplish." MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in Present Day Law
Practice, 3 VAwD. L. Rue. 369, 372 (1950).
89 "To let general words draw nourishment from their purpose is one thing. To
draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal meaning of words is
quite another." Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J.).
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general legislative aspirations is not administratively feasible, and (2)
the intention to tolerate such discrepancies is not likely to be recited in
the purpose clause. A court should not automatically assume, therefore,
that a purpose clause precisely and comprehensively records the actual
legislative intent of the statute.
Sometimes a specific working provision conflicts squarely with the
express statement of a legislative purpose under circumstances in which
it can be reliably inferred that the legislature intended such conflicts to
be resolved in favor of the specific working provision. For example, in
the codification of military laws culminating in the enactment of title 10,
(Armed Forces) of the United States Code, the codifiers made a dear-
cut error in section 1333(3)0 through a cross reference that was im-
properly limited to section 1332(a)(1). So written, section 1333(3)
unequivocally excluded, for the purposes of computing the retired pay
of nonregular members, service performed after July 1, 1949. In thus
changing pre-existing law, the section failed to fulfill the legislative
aspiration announced in section 49(a) of the Act: "In sections 1-48
of this Act, it is the legislative purpose to restate, without substantive
change, the law replaced by those sections on the effective date of this
Act."' The question immediately arose whether section 1333(3) of
title 10, which was enacted by section 1 of the Act, or section 49(a) of
the same Act controlled. The question was submitted to the Comptroller
General.
Under the view, now widely held, that purpose is the touchstone of
interpretation, it would be easy to conclude that section 49(a) con-
trolled. Such an interpretation would turn a mere legislative aspiration
into a guarantee of success.
Such a result, unfortunately, would be doctrinally unsound and
practically catastrophic. The contrary result may be defended on the
ground that section 49(a) did not exhaust the general purposes of the
Act, because it failed to state that the Act's central purpose was not
only to restate pre-existing law accurately but also to enact a statutory
codification law that could be relied on, at least where uncertainty of
meaning did not arise. Not to preserve the reliability of the clear
language used (which included preserving the integrity of the codifiers'
clear-cut errors) would have destroyed the effectiveness of the codifica-
tion act and frustrated its central purpose, which was to establish a
code whose clear language could be relied on.
0 Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 1, 70A Stat. 103, now 10 U.S.C. § 1333(4) (1970).
91Id. § 49(a), 70A Stat. 640, quoted in note preceding 10 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
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Such an interpretation would have had the same effect as section
2(a) of the Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712,92 "An Act to consolidate,
codify, and set forth the general and permanent laws of the United
States in force December seventh, one thousand nine hundred and
twenty-five," the act that established the United States Code. This
section provided:
The matter set forth in the Code . . . shall establish prima
facie the laws of the United States, general and permanent in
their nature, in force on the 7th day of December, 1925; but noth-
ing in this Act shall be construed as repealing or amending any
such law, or as enacting as new law any matter contained in the
Code. In case of any inconsistency arising through omission or
otherwise between the provisions of any section of this Code and
the corresponding portion of legislation heretofore enacted effect
shall be given for all purposs whatsoever to such enactments.'
The practical effect of this provision was to reduce the Act to the equival-
ent of a mere editorial compilation (however official), instead of an
effective code. Not eveh its clearest provisions could be fully relied on.
During the preparation of title 10, one participant even suggested
the inclusion of a saving clause that would have said, in effect: "Any
substantive error that has been made in this codification is hereby cor-
rected."(!) This was summarily rejected, because such a provision
would have had the same devastating effect as section 2(a) of the 1926
Act.
Did the Comptroller General read section 49(a) as overriding the
clear mandate of section 1333(3)? Fortunately, he did not."
The lesson is clear. Although specific working provisions, which
carry the legislative freight, should always be read in light of the total
legislative context, including the limitations implied by any manifest
ulterior or other general legislative purpose, the latter should not be
treated as a definitive, overriding pronouncement.
Summary
If this analysis is correct, the following conclusions would seem
warranted:
(1) The necessity of assuming some actual subjective purpose includes
only the necessity of assuming an immediate purpose exhausted by
0244 Stat (pt. 1) 1.
03M., quoted in 1 UNTED STATEs CODE at lxix.
IM 36 CoMP. GEN. 498 (1957).
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the statute. This purpose is best identified by the term "legislative
intent." Being coextensive with the problem of intended meaning,
this concept normally furnishes, not a solution to, but a more helpful
statement of the problem.
(2) Beyond the immediate legislative purpose that is identified with
legislative intent, an ulterior legislative purpose, while normal, need
not be assumed in every instance; actual consensus is less likely to
exist in this area. If a legislative purpose is in fact discoverable
from the statute and its proper context, it may or may not be useful
in resolving uncertainties of meaning, if any, that would otherwise
exist.
(3) Subjective purpose, not being directly knowable, can be ascertained
only by inference from the external manifestations of purpose. These
include the statute and the elements of proper context. The necessity
of relying on inference raises problems of relevance and comparative
reliability for which the concept of subjective purpose provides an
invaluable guide. However, for purposes of cognition it does
not warrant resorting to inappropriate manifestations of purpose or
attributing to the statute meaning that the words of the statute
taken in their proper context are incapable of bearing.
(4) The manifestations of legislative intent are normally fuller and
more reliable than those of any broader or more remote legislative
purpose.
(5) The manifestation of a legislative purpose does not imply that the
working provisions of the statute were adopted as perfect instru-
ments of that purpose. Therefore, if there is a discrepancy between
manifest ulterior purpose and the working provisions, it does not
necessarily follow that the working provisions were intended to be
read as not containing the discrepancy.
(6) If neither legislative intent nor legislative purpose can be reliably
inferred from the statute when read in its proper context, the court
may attribute to the statute a purpose that supports the "meaning"
that is most consistent with the clear elements of the statute and its
related laws. This constitutes an act of judicial lawmaking.
1975]
